The impact of Objective 1 funds on regional growth convergence in the EU: a panel-data approach by Esposti, Roberto & Bussoletti, Stefania
www.ssoar.info
The impact of Objective 1 funds on regional growth
convergence in the EU: a panel-data approach
Esposti, Roberto; Bussoletti, Stefania
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Esposti, R., & Bussoletti, S. (2008). The impact of Objective 1 funds on regional growth convergence in the EU: a
panel-data approach. Regional Studies, 42(2), 159-173. https://doi.org/10.1080/00343400601142753
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-133033
For Peer Review Only
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The impact of Objective 1 funds on regional growth 
convergence in the EU. A panel-data approach 
 
 
Journal: Regional Studies 
Manuscript ID: CRES-2005-0191.R1 
Manuscript Type: Main Section 
JEL codes: 
O18 - Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses < O1 - Economic 
Development < O - Economic Development, Technological Change, 
and Growth, R11 - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, 
Development, and Changes < R1 - General Regional Economics < R 
- Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics, R58 - Regional 
Development Policy < R5 - Regional Government Analysis < R - 
Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics 
Keywords: 
GMM Estimation, Objective 1, Panel-data, Regional Convergence, 
Structural Funds 
  
 
 
 
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
For Peer Review Only
 
1 
 
The Impact of Objective 1 Funds on Regional Growth 
Convergence in the EU  
A panel-data approach 
 
Roberto Esposti (corresponding author)° 
Department of Economics – Polytechnic University of Marche (Italy) 
Piazzale Martelli, 8 – 60121 Ancona (Italy)  
Phone: +39 071 2207119 
Fax: +39 071 2207102 
E-mail: r.esposti@univpm.it 
 
Stefania Bussoletti 
Department of EU Policies – Marche Region (Italy) 
Via Gentile da Fabriano, 9 - 60125 Ancona (Italy) 
 E-mail: stefania.bussoletti@regione.marche.it 
 
 
                                               
°
 Authorship may be attributed as follows: the first, third and fifth sections to Bussoletti, the second, forth 
and sixth sections to Esposti. We are grateful to Pierpaolo Pierani for his valuable suggestions regarding 
the estimation procedures, and to two anonymous referees and the Editor for their helpful comments on a 
previous version of the paper.     
Page 1 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 
2 
 
The Impact of Objective 1 Funds on Regional Growth Convergence in the EU  
A panel-data approach 
 
Abstract 
This article investigates the impact of Objective 1 structural funds expenditure on EU regions 
by estimating an augmented conditional convergence econometric model. According to this 
model, growth convergence is influenced by the policy treatment, which affects the regional 
initial investment rate by interacting with other regional structural variables and eventually 
influencing its steady state level. The convergence model is specified in a dynamic panel-data 
form and estimated using a database of 206 EU15 regions observed from 1989 to 2000. A 
GMM estimation is applied to obtain consistent estimates of both parameter β and impact of 
the Objective 1 policies. 
  
Keywords: Regional Convergence, Objective 1 Funds, Panel Data, GMM Estimation 
J.E.L. Classification: R110, R580, O180  
Introduction  
This article aims to identify the impact of the European Union (EU) Structural Funds (SF) in 
Objective 1 regions; that is, those policy measures specifically delivered to regions whose per 
capita (hereafter p.c.) income is less than 75% of the EU average. For this purpose, we as-
sume that structural payments may condition the “natural” convergence process of the poorer 
European regions towards the richer ones. We estimate, therefore, an augmented conditional 
regional convergence model to assess whether growth convergence is actually observed over 
the whole 1989-2000 period, and whether structural payments significantly affect it and dif-
ferences in this respect emerge across EU regions. 
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A data set of more than 200 NUTS II European regions observed over this period enables a 
dynamic panel-data specification of the conditional convergence model. This dynamic model 
is estimated by means of an appropriate GMM estimator. Alternative GMM estimates are also 
proposed and discussed. 
Objective 1 treatment started in 1989 and involves a relevant part of the European Union: 
currently, about 50 regions, 20% of the population, i.e. 70 millions of inhabitants. The EU 
spends between 20% and 25% of its annual budget on SF for Objective 1 regions, which 
means about 0,25% of the whole EU GDP (European Commission, 2004). Nevertheless, the 
size of the growth gap remains so relevant in absolute terms to motivate serious doubts about 
the presence of any real convergence process within the Union and about the effectiveness of 
this financial effort in this respect.            
Previous empirical estimates of regional convergence within the EU provide mixed and con-
troversial results. This may be motivated by the large amount of different model specifica-
tions, data and econometric methods used in this literature. Croci Angelini (2002) surveyed 
16 different estimations of unconditional convergence across the EU published from 1992 to 
2000; the convergence rate varies between 0,4% and 2,9%; indeed, however, several studies 
actually provide evidence against the regional unconditional β-convergence in the EU (Abra-
ham and Van Rompuy, 1995; Molle and Boeckhout, 1995).  
Very different results, particularly in terms of convergence speed, are obtained also when a 
panel and dynamic specification is used. Canova and Marcet (1995) report a very high con-
vergence speed (about 11% for the EU countries, 23% for the regions). On the contrary, there 
is an increasing number of recent panel-data studies not showing any clear evidence of un-
conditional convergence across EU countries and, above all, regions (Boldrin and Canova, 
2001). Within this approach, conditional convergence is strongly supported by some empiri-
cal works (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1996; Neven and Gouyette, 1995), while contested by 
others. Moreover, several recent empirical studies are increasingly corroborating the so-called 
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club-convergence, that is convergence observed within subgroups of regions (Chatterji, 1993; 
Canova, 1999; Quah, 1996)1. 
Despite this large body of empirical literature, there is far less abundance of empirical analy-
ses about regional convergence conditional on Objective 1 payments (Rodriguez-Pose and 
Fratesi, 2004; Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger, 2003). In the Third Cohesion Report, the EU Com-
mission (European Commission, 2004) provides an unconditional convergence rate estimate 
of 0,5% for the 1980-1988 period over the whole EU space; this rate increases to 0,7% and 
0,9% in the periods 1989-1993 and 1994-2000, respectively. During these two programming 
periods, the convergence rate observed only across Objective 1 regions has been much higher, 
3,1% and 1,6%, respectively.  
This latter evidence, however, is not sufficient to demonstrate a positive impact of SF on this 
convergence process. In addition, it is of major interest to assess whether this impact actually 
differs across Objective 1 regions or groups of regions. This difference may occur either for 
the different amount of funds or for the different selection of interventions to be funded, but 
also for the different resource endowment across regions in terms of infrastructure, human 
and knowledge capital, with which the SF themselves interact. Also in this respect, however, 
sound empirical evidence is lacking or controversial.    
This article aims to contribute in this direction.   
Conditional β-convergence and policy treatment  
State of the art 
In the past two decades, a significant and increasing body of empirical studies on regional 
growth have been based (explicitly or not) on neoclassical convergence theory (Islam, 2003). 
Actually, the first empirical convergence analysis due to Baumol (1986) was a “simple” a 
linear regression where the p.c. income growth depended on its initial level as only independ-
ent variable (this is the so-called unconditional convergence model).  
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Subsequent works added some other regressors to this specification. Though these works may 
be now interpreted as first attempts to estimate conditional convergence models, they still 
used ad hoc specifications, that is, not strictly derived from any underlying growth model. In 
1992, two seminal empirical works by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw et al. 
(1992), rigorously derived this linear regression specification from the transition dynamics of 
the neoclassical growth model (in both the Solow-Swan and Cass-Koopmans versions). This 
is the “formal” or “model-based” specification of the growth convergence model. It still 
makes the p.c. income growth depend on the initial income level, but other conditioning vari-
ables are added, and these are strictly and exclusively justified by the underlying theoretical 
framework.   
One major interest, here, is to assess if policy measures (hereafter “the policy treatment”) af-
fect somehow this regional growth convergence pattern. Most previous empirical assessments 
of the effect of regional policies on growth seemingly revert to the initial “informal” specifi-
cation, because difficulties arise when giving these a stronger theoretical justification: that is, 
when consistently including them as conditioning variables in the formal model. 
When formally derived from neoclassical growth theory, the conditional β-convergence2 
model can be written as follows (Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995): 
(1a) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 000000 ln1ln11ln11ln1,0, i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
iiiit YegneseAegtXTYyE
λλλλ δ
α
α
α
α −−−− −−++
−
−−
−
−+−+==
 
On the left-hand side, yit is the i-th region’s p.c. (or per unit of labour) income growth rate 
over period t, Yi0 is the i-th region’s initial (at time 0) p.c. income, Xi0 denotes a set of other 
conditioning variables and Ti=0 indicates that no policy treatment has been delivered to the i-
th region during the period. The right-hand side makes explicit the whole set of conditioning 
variables: g is the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth rate, λ is the speed (or rate) of con-
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vergence, Ai0 is the i-th region’s initial TFP, 0<α<1 is the coefficient (indicating the capital’s 
share or capital intensity within the economy) of the underlying Cobb-Douglas production 
function with two factors (K, L) and constant returns to scale, si0 is the i-th region’s initial 
investment rate, ni0 is the i-th region’s initial population (or employment) growth rate, δ is the 
capital depreciation rate. According to the underlying growth model, however, g, δ, α and λ 
are constant parameters across regions and over time. Thus, the remaining conditional vari-
ables, beside Yi0, are Ai0, si0 and ni0. These are the only legitimate conditioning variables in a 
neoclassical model-based conditional convergence model. We have different steady-states, 
therefore conditional convergence, if regions differ in terms of these conditioning variables.   
Equation (1a) describes the regional growth convergence pattern toward the respective steady-
state. The steady-state output per unit of actual labour, tYˆ , implied by (1a) is (Mankiw et al., 
1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995): 
(2) ( )[ ]δ
α
α
++−
−
++= gnsAgtY iiit 000 lnln1
lnˆln  
By substituting equation (2) in equation (1a), we can rewrite the convergence model as fol-
lows:  
(1b) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 000 ln1ˆln1,0, ittttiiiit YeYegt eXTYyE λλλ −−− −−−+==  
In the present study, the main issue is how to include the policy treatment (Ti≠0), that is Ob-
jective 1 expenditure, in the regional conditional convergence mode  above. In this respect, 
we may acknowledge that SF influence the regional economy on several aspects and in a 
complex way (European Commission, 2001 and 2004). Regional macroeconomic models 
have been proposed to take into account all these possible effects both on the demand and the 
supply side; some of these approaches are reviewed in Bradley et al. (2003). For instance, the 
neo-Keynesian HERMIN model (Bradley et al., 1995 and 2003) has been adopted to simulate 
the effect of Objective 1 funds on EU peripheral regions by capturing both the short-run de-
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mand-side and the long-run supply-side impacts, the latter effects incorporating mechanisms 
that are based on the endogenous growth literature.   
Despite the relevance of the demand-side effects, here we want to emphasize how SF influ-
ence the long-run supply-side variables, eventually effecting growth convergence. After all, 
the declared ultimate objective of Objective 1 policies is to permanently reduce the gap be-
tween poor and rich EU regions (European Commission, 2001; Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi, 
2004).3 Limiting the attention only on this aspect does not definitely exhaust the complex is-
sue of SF evaluation, but it still seems consistent with their underlying major policy goal, at 
least in Objective 1 regions.4 
According to equation (1a), SF expenditure may influence long-run growth in three different 
ways, corresponding to the conditioning variables si0, Ai0, g and ni0. First, it may increase the 
regional investment rate s, thus the capital deepening process eventually leading to higher 
steady state p.c. capital and GDP. Second, it may increase the regional TFP by either improv-
ing its initial level Ai0 or the growth rate g. Third, it may influence the labour market thus the 
workforce growth rate ni0, which, in turn, negatively influences the steady state level. In the 
present paper, however, among these possible effects we only consider the influence of SF on 
s.  
On the one hand, it must beard in mind that making g endogenous or different across regions, 
as in some endogenous growth models and in the extensive version of the neoclassical model 
with human capital (Mankiw et al., 1992), would make the concept of growth convergence 
inherently ambiguous (Islam, 2003).  Puigcerver-Peñalver (2004) models the impact of Objec-
tive policy following this approach, but it must be acknowledged that under this hypothesis 
the neoclassical growth convergence model does not seem the appropriate theoretical frame-
work. Linking SF expenditure to the regional initial TFP can be more correct and could be 
also related to regional structural characteristics, in particular sectoral composition. This ap-
proach has been recently followed by De la Fuente (1996) and Esposti (2006). 
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On the other hand, Objective 1 funds may favour unemployment reduction but this effect can 
not be simply expressed in terms of ni0. In the neoclassical growth model, ni0 indicates the 
regional initial population (or employment) growth rate under the implicit assumption of full 
employment or of a constant employment rate over time and across regions. However, the 
employment rate largely differs across the EU15 regions and also evolved differently during 
the 1990s (Paci et al., 2002).  Thus, GDP growth per labour unit rather than p.c. GDP growth 
should be used as dependent variable in equation (1a) to take account of unemployment re-
duction induced by SF. It follows that ni0 should express employment growth rather than 
population growth, but still indicating long-term changes across regions and over time, as a 
consequence of structural behavioural changes, particularly participation to labour market, 
fertility and migration rates. These behavioural can be hardly be affected by some regional 
policy. In fact, to our knowledge, no empirical study has modelled the impact of SF on re-
gional growth convergence in terms of employment growth.  
In fact, Objective 1 funds should be prevalently considered as investments, as most of them 
(92% in the whole 1989-1999 period, 98% in the 1994-1999 programming period) concen-
trate on three main areas: infrastructure, human capital, support to other (mainly private) in-
vestments, R&D included (Bussoletti, 2004; European Commission, 2001 and 2004; Rodri-
guez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004).5 
 
The model 
We may conclude that the most natural way to include SF into a regional growth convergence 
model is to make them affect the investment rate, s, given that they are mostly investments. 
According to this straightforward argument, these funds are here interpreted as an increase of 
the capital stock in the unit of time, that is tKK ∂∂=
•
, and, consequently, of the investment 
rate ψ
•
=Ks , where ψ is the regional GDP. Considering SF expenditure as capital accumula-
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tion has the advantage to model the different impact of the aforementioned different areas of 
intervention (infrastructure, human capital and R&D), and how they interact in shaping the 
growth convergence process. 
Distinguishing among different kinds of investment (human capital, infrastructure, R&D and 
so on) in analysing Objective 1 SF is not new and is also consistent with the different strategic 
axes designed for this policy (European Commission, 2001). In some studies, the policy 
treatment itself is explicitly distinguished among these different investment categories, but 
this is done only at the country level or considering single regional cases (Bradley et al., 
2003; Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004). Unfortunately, in fact, current available data do not 
allow to attribute the whole Objective 1 expenditure to different investments at the regional 
level, unless we make this attribution exclusively on the basis of the underlying financing 
structural fund, that is ERDF, ESF, etc. (Puigcelver-Peñalver, 2004). However, it is often nei-
ther possible nor appropriate to associate the expenditure of a given EU structural fund to a 
specific investment typology.   
One possible way to proceed, therefore, is to model at the regional level the interaction be-
tween the overall amount of policy expenditure and the different capital assets (infrastructure, 
human capital, R&D), or some proxies of them. In fact, we can interpret the interaction pa-
rameters as combination of two effects. On the one hand, this interaction depends on the un-
derlying unobserved share of SF expenditure invested in that specific asset. On the other 
hand, it summarizes all those specific economic and technical characters affecting each capital 
asset’s formation; in particular, increasing or decreasing returns associated to each invest-
ment, depending on its depreciation and obsolescence, congestion or spillover effects and 
other relevant aspects in this respect. 6  
Here, we model these aspects by specifying a capital formation function. Firstly, we can cu-
mulate past expenditure in new capital formation by measuring the treatment as a weighted 
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sum of past policy expenditure per labour unit within the region, that is ∑
=
−=
Z
s
sitsit MwT
0
, 
where ws is the weight indicating the “portion” of the policy expenditure per labour unit, M, 
delivered at time t-s affecting the outcome at time t, and Z is the maximum lag. Secondly, we 
can derive the following relation between the regional investment rate s and this policy treat-
ment, representing how this public expenditure converts into the abovementioned different 
capital assets and interacts with them (see the appendix for the specification of the capital 
formation function and detailed derivation of equation (3)):              
 (3) 
004030201
04030201000
lnlnlnlnlnlnlnlnln
lnlnlnlnlnln
iiiiiiiii
iiiiiii
YITRDpuTRDprTHT
IRDpuRDprHTs
−++++
+++++=
ττττ
φφφφφγ
 
where: 0iH = initial human capital in the i-th region, i.e. the proportion of regional population 
enrolled at the University degree level on total population; 0iRDpr = initial regional private (or 
business) R&D expenditure per labour unit; 0iRDpu = initial regional public (government) 
R&D expenditure per labour unit; 0iI = initial regional index of transport infrastructure en-
dowment. 
According to this representation, in particular, the structural policy affects growth conver-
gence by favouring the capital deepening process in Objective 1 regions, and this policy im-
pact is generated interacting with the current level of regional capital endowment in terms of 
human capital, R&D, infrastructure.     
Substituting equation (3) in (1a) and adopting a panel-data specification with a region-specific 
constant term ia , we obtain a regional convergence model conditional on the policy treatment 
Ti0: 
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(4) 
( )δχβϕϕϕϕϕ
ϕϕϕϕ
+++++++++
++++=





= ∑
−=
gnYITRDpuTRDprTHTI
RDpuRDprHTanIRDpuRDprHMwTYyE
iiiiiiiiiii
iiiiiiiiii
Zs
issiiit
00
*
00800700600504
0302010000000
0
00
lnlnlnlnlnlnlnlnlnlnln
lnlnlnln,,,,,,
 
where:  
( ) ( ) ititi eAegta γα
αλλ
−
−+−+= −−
1
1ln1 0  
( ) 00 11 φα
α
ϕ λ
−
−= − te , ( ) 11 11 φα
α
ϕ λ
−
−= − te , ( ) 22 11 φα
α
ϕ λ
−
−= − te , ( ) 33 11 φα
α
ϕ λ
−
−= − te , 
( ) 44 11 φα
α
ϕ λ
−
−= − te , ( ) 15 11 τα
α
ϕ λ
−
−= − te , ( ) 26 11 τα
α
ϕ λ
−
−= − te , ( ) 37 11 τα
α
ϕ λ
−
−= − te , 
( ) 48 11 τα
α
ϕ λ
−
−= − te  
( )
αα
β
β
λ
−
−
−=
−
=
−
1
1
1
*
te
 
( )
α
α
χ λ
−
−−= −
1
1 te   
Equation (4) is an augmented conditional growth convergence model, where the conventional 
conditioning variables (lnAi0 and ni0) are now combined with new ones (Ti0, Hi0, RDpri0, 
RDpri0, Ii0). These variables are now part of the formal conditional convergence model affect-
ing the investment rate, s, and, in turn, the steady state level.  
Equation (4) is still a “reduced” from model, because the underlying structural parameters 
32143210 ,,,,,,,,, τττφφφφφλα  and 4τ  can not be directly estimated. Nonetheless, by combin-
ing equations (1a), (3) and (4), they can be indirectly obtained through the estimated reduced-
form parameters as follows: 
*β
χ
α =  
[ ]
t
1*ln +−
−=
χβ
λ  
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χ
ϕ
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χ
ϕ
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χ
ϕ
τ
χ
ϕ
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χ
ϕ
φ
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ϕ
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ϕ
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χ
ϕ
φ
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ϕ
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3
2
2
1
1
0
0 ,,,,,,,, −=−=−=−=−=−=−=−=−=  
According to this convergence model, any region follows its own steady state growth path, as 
indicated by the estimated reduced-form parameters. In particular, β makes it possible to as-
sess whether convergence occurs and to derive its speed (λ); parameters χ and ϕ’s indicate 
whether or not convergence is conditional, and ϕ’s also reveal if the policy treatment has an 
effect and which is its magnitude. In addition, other individual effects ( 0ln iA  and iγ ), affect-
ing the regional initial investment rate and productivity and, consequently, the region-specific 
steady state level, are now included in the region specific ai term, which thus represents a fur-
ther conditioning variable.7  
According to equation (4), in any region, either treated or not, the growth convergence proc-
ess is conditioned on its initial level of H, I, RDpr and RDpu. The difference between treated 
and not treated regions, however, is that in the former case the policy treatment T itself be-
haves as a conditioning variable, as well as its interaction with H, I, RDpr and RDpu. In the 
latter case, the treatment is “off”, that is T=0, and, consequently, also all the interaction terms 
are 0. 8      
It is also possible to express the impact of additional SF payments on treated regions in terms 
of elasticity; from equation (3) it follows: 
(5a) 
040302010
0
,
lnlnlnln
ln
ln
iiii
is
ii
Ms IRDpuRDprHM
s
ττττφε ++++=
∂
∂
=  
which also leads to the elasticity expressing how, through si0, they  actually affect the steady-
state output per unit of actual labour (2)9: 
(5b) ( )040302010,ˆ lnlnlnln1ln
ˆln
iiii
is
i
MY
IRDpuRDprH
M
Y
ττττφ
α
α
ε ++++
−
=
∂
∂
=  
Despite the fact that parameters of equations (5a) and (5b) are constant across regions, they 
may still eventually generate different elasticities when multiplied by the region-specific 
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terms, H, I, RDpu and RDpr. Therefore, the impact of SF may differ both in magnitude and in 
sign across treated regions, and this is achieved without the introduction of region-specific 
slope coefficients. In this respect, the model allows to evaluate the SF impact over the whole 
Objective 1 EU space, but also the different behaviour of single Objective 1 regions or group 
regions (for instance, Objective 1 regions of a given EU country).      
Data description 
Comparable GDP, population and other economic data at the NUTS II regional level are 
taken from the Newcronos Regio database (Eurostat); GDP data are expressed in Purchasing 
Power Standard (PPS) currency.10 This regional database covers all the 206 EU15 NUTS II 
regions over the whole 1989-2000 period.11 In order to be fully consistent with the neoclassi-
cal growth model, we use the GDP growth per labour unit as dependent variable of equation 
(4). P.c. GDP growth is more frequently used in empirical work, but it implicitly assumes full 
employment or a constant employment rate over time and across regions, eventually making 
the two growth rates equivalent. As mentioned, however, employment rates and their evolu-
tion over time largely differ across the EU15 regions. Use of p.c. GDP growth might therefore 
generate a significant bias in parameter estimates.  
Currently available EU regional data provide comparable regional employment growth rate, 
that is, ni0. Moreover, although regional observations on δ and g are lacking, many empirical 
works make assumptions about the common value of the (δ + g) term. Mankiw et al. (1992) 
assume (δ + g) = 0,05, which is what is done here.12  
Data about SF expenditure in Objective 1 regions refer to annual payments in the two pro-
gramming periods 1989-1993 and 1994-1999. In order to include the total contribution, all SF 
are considered (ERDF, which is the main contributor to Objective 1 programme, ESF, 
EAGGF and FIFG). Unfortunately, a single centralised database on SF expenditure at re-
gional level does not exist. This variable has therefore been reconstructed on the basis of in-
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formation provided by the European Commission Annual Reports on SF payments and con-
sidering both regional and multiregional programmes.13 
All Objective 1 payments are expressed in PPS currency, using the same conversion index as 
employed by EUROSTAT to convert regional income into the common comparable currency. 
Table 1 reports in detail the average Objective 1 per capita payments during the period under 
study, distinguished between regional and multiregional funds. 
With respect to the other conditioning variables, H, I, RDpr and RDpu, it must be reminded 
that they indicate the respective capital endowment per unit of labour (see the appendix for 
details). These variables can be hardly measured with precision, given the currently available 
information. Nonetheless, we can use proxies for them to have a reliable representation of the 
different endowment across regions. 
For H, we use as proxy the share of tertiary level students on total population; this seems 
more robust than the share of tertiary level graduates on total population, which shows a 
much larger difference across countries due to different age structure and education systems. 
Data are taken from Newcronos Regio database (Eurostat) and cover the period 1993-1998. 
Thus, the values of H before 1993 and after 1998 are assumed to be equal to the 1993 and 
1998 levels, respectively.  
For RDpu and RDpr, we use the respective data reported in the Newcronos Regio database 
(Eurostat) and divided by the units of labour. To be consistent with the other variables, this 
R&D expenditure has been converted in the PPS currency.  
Finally, I has been proxied by a synthetic variable indicating the regional infrastructure en-
dowment per inhabitant. This variable have been obtained starting from two index variables 
calculated at the NUTS 3-region level by the European Spatial Planning Observation Network 
(ESPON, 2004) indicating the “Potential accessibility multimodal” and the “Connectivity to 
transport terminals by car (hours) of the capital or centroid representative of the NUTS3”. 
These two variables have been firstly indexed with respect to the respective maximum values 
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and then cumulated to have an aggregate index varying between 0 and 2. Finally, for any 
NUTS 2 region this index has been computed as weighted average of the respective NUTS 3 
regions.14  
For all model variables, table 2 reports the average values in Objective 1 regions by country. 
With respect to the growth variable, it can be noticed that Portuguese, German and French 
Objective 1 regions show the lowest GDP per labour unit. German and French cases, how-
ever, concern quite specific and peculiar situations, i.e. the former Eastern Germany and 
Overseas regions, respectively. Among these poorest cases, German regions show the best 
growth performance whereas, on the contrary, French and Portuguese ones achieve a slower 
growth, a performance similar to Spanish regions, which have, however, the highest initial 
GDP levels on average.      
In terms of conditioning variables, large disparities can be observed among national groups of 
Objective 1 regions. The highest average value of SF expenditure (M) is observed in the 
Greek and Portuguese regions, while the lowest levels concern French and German regions, 
despite their larger growth lag. This confirms that these latter cases are somehow anomalous 
with respect to the rest of the Objective 1 EU space. In fact, in terms of R&D investment, 
German regions show by large the highest value, as well as the French cases, where the very 
low private expenditure is compensated by high public R&D. Less divergence can be ob-
served with respect to H and I, though German regions excel, again, in terms infrastructure 
endowment and Greek ones in terms of education levels.15       
 
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
The estimated model 
The regional conditional convergence model in equation (4) is estimated using the regional 
panel database described above.16 The dynamic panel-data specification has become frequent 
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in growth convergence empirical studies (Carmeci and Mauro, 2003; Caselli et al., 1996; Yu-
dong and Weeks, 2000). The simplest dynamic version is an AR(1) model:  
(6) 
( ) ititititititititit
ititititititititit
gnYITRDpuTRDprT
HTIRDpuRDprHTyay
εδχβϕϕϕ
ϕϕϕϕϕϕρ
++++++++
+++++++=
−−−−−−−−
−−−−−−−−
11
*
118117116
11514131211101
lnlnlnlnlnlnlnln
lnlnlnlnlnlnln
 
where ρ is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. 1−itT  indicates the regional policy treat-
ment here specified as ∑
−
−=
−− =
3
1
1 3
1
s
sitit MT , that is a three years average expenditure per labour 
unit (Mit), to mitigate the relevant variation usually observed on a yearly basis.  
The error term of equation (6) contains the region-specific effect as follows:   
(7a) itiit νµε +=  
It therefore comprises a time-constant and a time-varying component, but with both varying 
over the cross section dimension. If the individual effect is assumed fixed (non-random), it 
follows: 
(7b) νσεσνµε =⇒+= )( ititiit  
and the constant term now becomes ai = (a + µi), i.e. region-specific as in equation (4). Alter-
natively, a random region-specific effect may be assumed, with 0)( =iE µ  and ii σµσ =)( . 
From this it follows that: 
(7c) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )itiiitiitiititiit EEEE νµσσεσνµενµε ν ++==+=⇒+= )(;0  
Under random effects, even assuming ( ) 0=itiE νµ , the variance-covariance matrix of the 
error term (Σ) is not diagonal, that is I2σ≠Σ .  
Islam (2003) and Abreu et al. (2005) underline that the random effect specification is not ac-
ceptable under the neoclassical growth framework, because it implies that individual effects 
are correlated with some regressors (expected to be exogenous), As evident from equation (4), 
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both contains the same parameters related to the underlying regional growth pattern. Random 
effects would thus generate biased estimates because of endogeneity bias. For this major rea-
son, we only consider here the fixed effect version of equation (6).  
This dynamic specification explicitly takes into account the serial correlation, which often 
affects income growth. Disregarding this aspect would make estimates inconsistent due to the 
omitted variable bias. Introducing the lagged values of the dependent variable, however, im-
plies that the i.i.d. hypothesis of the itν  term no longer holds true, because it is correlated with 
the lagged dependent variable. In other words, 1−ity is endogenous (Arellano, 2003).  
Consequently, an instrumental variable estimator must be used to achieve consistent estimates 
of parameters in equation (6). Here, the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) is adopted. This requires rewriting equation (6) in the first-differences (GMM-DIFF 
estimator), because this generates a first differenced error term itε∆  that is uncorrelated with 
any lagged level variable sity −  (∀s ≥ 2). These lagged variables are thus valid instruments 
according to the moment (orthogonality) condition [ ] 0=∆ −sitit yE ε . The one-step and two-
step GMM estimators proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) are applied. Although both are 
consistent, the latter provides asymptotically efficient estimates.17   
Blundell and Bond (1998) showed that the GMM-DIFF estimator may give rise to marked 
small-sample bias and the precision of the estimates tends to decrease in AR(1) specifications 
whenever the autocorrelation coefficient is close to 1. For this reason (also known as weak 
instruments problem), the lagged levels may be poor instruments in first difference equations. 
These authors suggest an alternative GMM estimator (GMM-SYS), where a system of equa-
tions is estimated by adding equations in levels to first-difference equations, given that, under 
a mean stationary AR(1) process,  the lagged first difference 1−∆ ity  is uncorrelated with itε , so 
can be used as valid instrument for the respective level equation, according to the moment 
condition [ ] 01 =∆ −itit yE ε . The GMM-SYS estimator is also adopted here. 
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The improvement provided by the GMM-SYS estimator in finite samples, however, is ques-
tioned in several empirical applications where GMM-DIFF estimates appear to be more ro-
bust especially when the two-step procedure is followed (Lucchetti et al., 2001). In general 
terms, it is often concluded that no single estimator of dynamic panel models is superior in all 
circumstances (Badinger et al., 2002). Nevertheless, in the recent growth convergence litera-
ture, the GMM-SYS estimator provided more moderate and realistic rates of convergence, 
ranging from 2 to 4% per annum, quite close to most cross-section studies.18  
A major issue concerning GMM estimators is the selection of the instrumental variables. 
Here, all available and admitted lagged income growth variables are considered. We also in-
clude as instruments the out-sample observations, that is the annual growth rates of GDP per 
labour unit observed in the period 1980-1988. To assess the consistency of the instruments 
selection, an overidentifying restrictions (Sargan) test is adopted (Arellano, 2003).19 Under 
the null hypothesis, this test assumes that all the selected instruments are valid, i.e. exoge-
nous. The rejection of the null would thus indicate an inappropriate selection of the instru-
mental variables. Problems may also arise from the incorrect specification of the dynamic 
structure of the model. Adopted here are the first and second order serial correlation LM tests 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).20 If the AR(1) specification holds true, we should 
observe first order correlation (generated by first-differentiation) but no second order correla-
tion. 
 
Results 
Tables 3 and 4 report the four GMM estimates (one-step and two-step GMM-DIFF and 
GMM-SYS) of the dynamic model (equation (6)). Results are firstly presented under the un-
conditional convergence case (table 3); conditioning variables are then added (table 4).   
Under the unconditional convergence model, in all four estimates the autocorrelation coeffi-
cient is quite low (always less than 0,1 in absolute value), but statistically different from 0 and 
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negative in the case of GMM two-step estimate. In the conditional convergence model, how-
ever, the autocorrelation coefficient is always positive, though still quite little and statistically 
different from 0 only in the two-step GMM-DIFF case. This positive value suggests slight 
persistency in growth rates and implies a downward correction of the β coefficient estimate. 
In any case, such a low autocorrelation coefficient tends to exclude any problem of non-
stationarity and may reduce the gain obtained with the GMM-SYS estimation.  
β convergence is bserved across all specifications and estimators both in the unconditional 
and conditional convergence case. Confirming previous evidence, however, the GMM-DIFF 
estimation of the conditional convergence rate λ is higher than the GMM-SYS one (4,2% and 
1,9%, respectively, in the two step case), though the difference is less remarkable than ob-
served in other studies (Bond et al., 2001). 
Major interest in estimation results concerns the role of the conditioning variables (table 4). 
As expected, two-step GMM estimates provide more statistically significant estimates; in ad-
dition, the GMM-DIFF estimates seem to perform better in this respect. In particular, with the 
two-step GMM-DIFF estimation all estimated parameters are statistically different from zero 
and behave correctly, according to expected signs. 
More in detail, the parameter concerning employment growth (χ) is always negative, as ex-
pected, and mostly statistically significant. The significant downward impact on the regional 
growth rate ranges between 0,045 and 0,105. These values play a role in calculation of the 
implicit structural parameters, given that χ affects α, φ’s and τ’s and the respective elastic-
ities.    
In addition, all GMM estimates provide similar evidence about the role of H, RDpr, RDpu and 
I, as indicated by the estimated 1ϕ , 2ϕ 3ϕ and 4ϕ . As might be expected, the impact of H, RDpr 
and I on regional growth performance, given the initial GDP per unit of labour, is positive and 
always statistically significant under the two-step GMM-DIFF case, with H showing the larg-
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est impact and I the smallest one. The only negative value concerns RDpu. This result, ob-
served in all GMM estimates, should not be interpreted as a negative effect of this variable on 
regional growth by itself, but as a substitution relationship between RDpu and RDpr, that 
makes the latter overwhelm, and eventually disguise, the effect of the former.  
Despite these quite homogenous and robust results, the impact of Objective 1 SF is not so 
immediate. On the one hand, the estimated 0ϕ  is always negative, though statistically differ-
ent from 0 only in the two-step GMM-DIFF case. On the other hand, however, the impact of 
variable T (the policy treatment) on the regional growth performance does not only depend on 
this parameter, because it is also affected by its interaction terms with H, RDpr, RDpu and I. 
As mentioned, the combination of these interaction terms can generate a different outcome 
across regions, both in sign and magnitude, of Objective 1 expenditure.          
 
[Tables 3 and 4 here] 
 
The elasticities reported in table 7 thus clarify the impact of the policy treatment over the 
whole set of Objective 1 regions and by country regional groups. Considering all Objective 1 
regions, it emerges an impact whose size significantly varies across different GMM estimates. 
Nonetheless, it is always positive, thus indicating that the conditioning effect of the policy 
treatment on regional growth convergence goes in the expected direction. Moreover, the elas-
ticity is quite limited in magnitude, in particular considering the two-step GMM-DIFF case 
that shows, as mentioned, the best statistical performance and robustness. Nonetheless, it 
largely varies between 0,04 and 0,14 with respect to the investment rate, and between 0,05 
and 0,51 with respect to the steady state output per unit of labour.  
When computed region-by-region or by clusters of regions, however, it emerges that these 
elasticities may differ even more largely. Thus, the impact of Objective 1 funds may indeed 
be negligible or even negative in several regional cases or groups. The highest positive impact 
Page 20 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 
21 
 
of SF is observed in French Objective 1 regions, where the elasticity with respect to Yˆ  ranges 
between 0,35 and 1,18. On the contrary, Germany, Greece and Spain show very low elasticity 
and even negative values under the two-step GMM-DIFF case. If we limit our attention to this 
latter estimate, we can observe that elasticity with respect to Yˆ  is greater than 0,15 only for 
France (0,40) and Portugal (0,17), almost negligible in Italy (0,02) and in the Other Objective 
1 regions (0,07), negative in Germany, Greece and Spain (-0,04, -0,03 and -0,02, respec-
tively).   
A limited but positive impact of Objective 1 funds over the whole EU space, with a negligi-
ble, or even negative, effect in some specific cases is, thus, the main evidence emerging from 
model estimates. In general terms, this result confirms some previous studies on the subject 
using a similar model specification and estimation approach (Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi, 
2004; Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger, 2003). In particular, Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2003) ob-
tained similar results with regard to Objective 1 funds, though they apply the convergence 
model to the EU15 countries and not, as seems more appropriate, to NUTS II regions (the 
actual recipients of these funds). Moreover, they specify the policy treatment in terms of  
payment growth rate instead of payment level,  the former apparently being much less regular 
and potentially more statistically “noisy” over a short time period. 
It is of major interest here to assess the consistency of GMM estimates with the underlying 
theoretical framework. Besides the statistical significance and correct sign of most of the pa-
rameters, the key evidence in this respect is provided by the implicit structural parameters 
(table 5). In particular, the α parameter indicates the capital intensity (that is, the capital in-
come share) within the economy. As stressed by Islam (2003), many convergence studies do 
not report the implicit value of this parameter or obtain values that are unreliable or even im-
possible. α must range between 0 and 1 and should realistically fall in the 0,30-0,50 interval. 
The GMM-DIFF estimation generates values of α close to this interval; it varies between 0,49 
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of the one-step case and 0,54 of the two-step estimation. On the contrary, the GMM-SYS pro-
vides less reliable values ranging from 0,78 to 0,82.  
Comparing the GMM estimates, one major conclusion is that there is no evidence that signifi-
cant gain can be obtained by passing from the GMM-DIFF to the GMM-SYS estimation. On 
the contrary, both in terms of statistical significance and of theoretical consistency, the GMM-
DIFF estimation seems to outperform the GMM-SYS. This is not surprising, however, be-
cause the GMM-SYS can improve the estimation performance, particularly under the already-
mentioned specific conditions concerning the sample and the model, but these conditions do 
not hold true in the present case. 
The choice of the appropriate instruments set, in fact, may be even more critical in the GMM-
SYS approach. Table 6 reports the diagnostic statistical tests in this respect. Firstly, LM tests 
support the AR(1) specification. As expected, always rejected is the hypothesis of no first-
order serial correlation of the differentiated error terms, while the hypothesis of no second-
order correlation is accepted. This dynamic specification also drives the choice of the instru-
ments. In this respect, however, the Sargan tests confirm that the instrumental variables have 
been selected correctly both in the GMM-DIFF and GMM-SYS, since the hypothesis that 
they are orthogonal to the differentiated residuals can be accepted.  
The validity of the extra-instruments included in the GMM-SYS estimation can be tested, by 
calculating the difference between the Sargan statistics obtained for the GMM-SYS and 
GMM-DIFF estimations. This difference is also called Difference Sargan and is asymptoti-
cally distributed as a χ2 with degrees of freedom given by the respective difference. Accord-
ing to this statistic, the validity of the extra-instruments may be accepted.               
 
[Tables 5, 6 and 7 here] 
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Some final remarks 
This article attempted to estimate the impact of EU SF on Objective 1 regions within a growth 
convergence model. By adopting a panel-data specification, the estimated conditional conver-
gence model is derived from the underlying neoclassical growth model where SF expenditure 
is included as determinant of the regional investment rate.  
The results confirm that dynamic specification may be more appropriate in this empirical ap-
plication. In general terms, and regardless of the estimator adopted, growth convergence is 
observed. As demonstrated in the recent literature on the topic, the convergence rate may sig-
nificantly vary across alternative specifications and estimators. Here, however, this variability 
seems less evident, as estimates of the conditional convergence rate have ranged between 
1,9% and 4,9%, not so different from what usually obtained in cross-sectional studies (2-3%).   
With regard to conditioning variables, a positive impact of SF on Objective 1 regions is con-
firmed over the whole EU space, although its statistical significance and magnitude may vary 
across alternative estimators. The impact of the Objective 1 policy on growth, however, is 
generally quite limited and may become negligible and even negative is some regional cases. 
For instance, when regions are grouped by country, a negative effect may observed for Ger-
man, Greek and Spanish Objective 1 regions. On the contrary, the French Objective 1 regions 
show the highest policy treatment effect.   
Comparing these results with previous studies on the impact of Objective 1 funds also empha-
sizes how relevant some apparently marginal issues may be. First of all, the lagged effect of 
funds over time is of major relevance and it is often disregarded in empirical works on the 
topic. In more general and, perhaps, obvious terms, the quality of the conditional convergence 
model estimates critically depends on how the policy under study is included in the model 
itself and how the respective data are treated.  
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APPENDIX 
Derivation of equation (3) 
By definition of investment rate, the following identity holds:  
0
0
00
00
0
0
0
i
i
ii
ii
i
i
i Y
k
L
LKK
s
•••
=
Ψ
=
Ψ
=  
where 0iΨ  and 0iK  are the initial regional GDP and capital, respectively; 0iY and 0ik  are the 
initial GDP and capital per unit of labour, respectively, and 
t
kk ii
∂
∂
=
•
0
0 . Taking the logarithms, 
we can write: 
(A.1) 000 lnlnln iii Yks −=
•
 
We assume that in the Cobb-Douglas production function underlying the neoclassical growth 
model, we can decompose the aggregate capital K in different assets, as done in previous 
studies for instance to distinguish physical capital and human capital (Mankiw et al., 1992). 
Here, we decompose K in: private physical capital (Γ ), human capital (Λ ), public physical 
capital or infrastructure (Θ ), private knowledge capital or private R&D ( prΠ ), public 
knowledge capital or public R&D ( puΠ ). We can thus re-write the Cobb-Douglas production 
function as follows: 
(A.2) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )ααααψ −−−−−− ΓΠΠΘΛ== 10100000010000 ihdcbihidicibiiiiii LpuprALKA  
where b, c, d and h are fixed parameters, and constant returns to scale are assumed both for 
the production function and the aggregation of capital. 
In terms of capital per unit of labour we can write: 
(A.3) 
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where H, I, RDpr, RDpu, P indicate the endowment per unit of labour of human capital, infra-
structure, private R&D, public R&D and private physical capital, respectively. 
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If we consider an investment (a SF payment) per unit of labour Ti with an unknown distribu-
tion among different assets, we can assume the following generic new capital formation func-
tion: 
(A.4) ( )000 , iii kTfk =
•
 
that is, the growth of capital per labour unit in the i-th region depends on the initial capital 
stock and on the policy expenditure 0iT . The latter is expected to have a positive effect on 
•
k , 
though this effect may differ according to the above-mentioned investment typologies (Γ , Λ , 
Θ , prΠ , puΠ ).  
The impact of a given investment in terms of new capital formation, however, also depends 
on the initial stock of capital. New investments, in fact, may show either increasing or de-
creasing returns with respect to capital formation due to several specific aspects, such as de-
preciation, obsolescence, spillover or congestion effects, etc. Therefore, 0ik  may influence the 
effect of an investment 0iT  on
•
0ik  in different ways and this is strongly related to the invest-
ment typology. 
We can approximate this generic capital formation function with a flexible functional form, 
like the translog: 
(A.5)  003020100 lnlnlnlnln iiiii kTakaTaak +++=
•
 
By substituting equation (A.3) in (A.5) we obtain: 
(A.6)
( )
003003003003
02020202020100
lnlnlnlnlnlnlnln
ln1lnlnlnlnlnln
iiiiiiii
iiiiiii
RDpuThaRDprTdaITcaHTba
PhdcbaRDpuhaRDprdaIcaHbaTaak
++++
−−−−++++++=
•
 
Unfortunately, neither a reliable measurement nor a proxy of 0iP  at the regional level can 
be easily identified. Moreover, our attention is mainly on the above-mentioned prevalent 
kinds of investment supported by Objective 1 funds. Therefore, in equation (A.6) we as-
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sume no interaction between the policy treatment 0iT  and 0iP  and we treat 0iP  as an unob-
served individual (regional) parameter: iiP ξ=0ln .  
It follows: 
(A.7)  
004003002001
04030201000
lnlnlnlnlnlnlnln
lnlnlnlnlnln
iiiiiiii
iiiiiii
ITRDpuTRDprTHT
IRDpuRDprHTk
ττττ
φφφφφγ
++++
+++++=
•
 
Where: 
( ) ii hdcbaa ξγ −−−−+= 120 , 10 a=φ , ba21 =φ , da22 =φ , ha23 =φ , ca24 =φ , ba31 =τ , da32 =τ , 
ha33 =τ , ca34 =τ . 
Substituting equation (A.7) in (A.1), we obtain equation (3): 
(3)  
0004003002001
04030201000
lnlnlnlnlnlnlnlnln
lnlnlnlnlnln
iiiiiiiii
iiiiiii
YITRDpuTRDprTHT
IRDpuRDprHTs
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Table 1: Statistical dispersion of per capita SF payments (in PPS) in Objective 1 regions, 
1989-1999 - CV expressed in % 
  Average Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation (CV) 
Year 
No. of 
regions 
Regional 
Funds 
Multiregional 
Funds 
Total 
Funds 
Regional 
Funds 
Multiregional 
Funds 
Total 
Funds 
Regional 
Funds 
Multiregional 
Funds 
Total 
Funds 
1989 45 81,9 67,0 148,9 65,6 69,9 85,9 80,1 104,3 57,7 
1990 45 98,6 89,4 188,0 132,0 173,2 203,8 133,9 193,7 108,4 
1991 51 85,6 64,2 149,8 75,0 78,4 97,7 87,6 122,1 65,2 
1992 51 147,7 73,7 221,4 174,4 108,7 198,0 118,1 147,5 89,4 
1992 51 132,2 99,5 231,7 103,2 106,3 135,9 78,1 106,8 58,7 
1994 58 130,9 211,6 342,5 143,1 664,4 790,7 109,3 314,0 230,9 
1995 58 132,4 155,0 287,4 106,5 213,7 302,9 80,4 137,9 105,4 
1996 58 127,2 228,8 356,0 158,6 641,1 785,4 124,7 280,2 220,6 
1997 57 146,9 197,5 344,4 143,4 429,3 559,1 97,6 217,4 162,3 
1998 57 157,5 285,7 443,2 153,5 649,0 777,0 97,5 227,2 175,3 
1999 57 159,6 177,2 336,8 123,1 249,1 321,8 77,1 140,6 95,5 
Source: Our elaboration on European Commission 
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Table 2: Average values (at 1994 where not indicated otherwise) of the model variables in 
Objective 1 regions (according to the 1994-1999 programming period) 
 
N.  
of re-
gions 
avg. 
growth 
rate of 
GDP per 
labour 
unit, 2000-
1989 (%) 
GDP 
per 
labour 
unit 
(PPS) 
M 
(PPS) H 
RDpr 
(PPS) 
RDpu 
(PPS) I** 
All EU15 Obj. 1 regions 57 4,5% 28535 866,0 2,36 67,1 91,7 0,44 
France - Obj. 1 regions 6 3,7% 19764 229,2 2,01 12,4 210,7 0,36 
Germany - Obj. 1 regions 6 6,9% 24595 213,4 1,68 177,8 137,2 0,62 
Greece - Obj. 1 regions 13 5,0% 28048 1172,0 3,02 21,8 27,9 0,38 
Italy - Obj. 1 regions 7 4,5% 33939 316,7 2,11 42,4 39,5 0,44 
Portugal - Obj. 1 regions 7 3,9% 22305 3150,7 2,04 17,0 32,4 0,37 
Spain - Obj. 1 regions 11 3,4% 36335 659,4 2,79 38,4 29,0 0,40 
Other EU15 Obj. 1 regions* 7 4,4% 31908 268,3 1,82 211,0 182,1 0,55 
* of which: 1 region of Netherlands, 1 of Austria, 1 of Belgium, Ireland and 3 of the United 
Kingdom 
 ** data refer to 1999 
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat and European Commission  
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Table 3: One-step and two-step GMM-DIFF and GMM-DSYS estimates of the dynamic 
unconditional convergence model - 206 EU15 regions 
Note: Estimated Standard Errors below the estimated values; * statistically significant at the 
5% level 
Estimation method ρ β Implicit 
λ 
GMM-DIFF One-step -0,007 (0,038) 
-0,061* 
(0,008) 0,063 
GMM-DIFF Two-steps -0,007* (0,003) 
-0,061* 
(0,001) 0,063 
GMM-SYS One-step 0,040 (0,041) 
-0,025* 
(0,011) 0,025 
GMM-SYS Two-steps -0,005* (0,013) 
-0,030* 
(0,004) 0,030 
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Table 4: One-step and two-step GMM-DIFF and GMM-SYS estimates of the dynamic conditional convergence model, equation (6) - 206 EU15 
regions 
Estimation 
method ρ β* χ ϕ0 ϕ1  ϕ2  ϕ3  ϕ4 ϕ5 ϕ6 ϕ7 ϕ8 
GMM-DIFF 
One-step 
0,015 
(0,039) 
-0,093* 
(0,016) 
-0,045* 
(0,015) 
-0,023 
(0,022) 
0,073* 
(0,017) 
0,043* 
(0,013) 
-0,039* 
(0,012) 
0,033 
(0,025) 
-0,014* 
(0,007) 
-0,001 
(0,003) 
0,003 
(0,003) 
-0,029 
(0,021) 
GMM-DIFF 
Two-steps 
0,010* 
(0,005) 
-0,090* 
(0,005) 
-0,048* 
(0,008) 
-0,022* 
(0,004) 
0,071* 
(0,008) 
0,043* 
(0,003) 
-0,040* 
(0,003) 
0,034* 
(0,005) 
-0,012* 
(0,005) 
-0,001* 
(0,0005) 
0,003* 
(0,001) 
-0,028* 
(0,003) 
GMM-SYS 
One-step 
0,048 
(0,042) 
-0,135* 
(0,031) 
-0,105 
(0,099) 
-0,042 
(0,043) 
0,061* 
(0,030) 
0,012 
(0,017) 
-0,002 
(0,013) 
0,102 
(0,069) 
-0,003 
(0,012) 
-0,001 
(0,003) 
0,006 
(0,006) 
-0,046* 
(0,023) 
GMM-SYS 
Two-steps 
0,019 
(0,016) 
-0,105* 
(0,010) 
-0,086* 
(0,024) 
-0,010 
(0,010) 
0,051* 
(0,011) 
0,014* 
(0,005) 
-0,007 
(0,005) 
0,023 
(0,024) 
-0,011* 
(0,004) 
0,001 
(0,002) 
0,002 
(0,002) 
-0,018* 
(0,008) 
Note: Estimated Standard Errors below the estimated values; * statistically significant at the 5% level 
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Table 5: One-step and two-step GMM-DIFF and GMM-SYS estimates of the implicit parameters  
 
Estimation method α λ 0φ  1φ  2φ  3φ  4φ  1τ  2τ  3τ  4τ  
GMM-DIFF One-step 0,487 0,049 -0,505 1,619 0,935 -0,861 0,741 -0,300 -0,018 0,075 -0,645 
GMM-DIFF Two-steps 0,540 0,042 -0,445 1,450 0,888 -0,817 0,687 -0,249 -0,027 0,067 -0,573 
GMM-SYS One-step 0,778 0,030 -0,399 0,587 0,115 -0,018 0,975 -0,030 -0,010 0,058 -0,443 
GMM-SYS Two-steps 0,820 0,019 -0,119 0,596 0,169 -0,086 0,274 -0,132 0,003 0,022 -0,214 
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Table 6: Tests of autocorrelation (LM) and over-identifying restrictions (Sargan)  
 
Test of first-order autocor-
relation 
(LM test) 
Test of second-order autocor-
relation 
(LM test) 
Test of over- iden-
tifying restrictions 
(Sargan test) 
GMM-DIFF 
   
One-step -8.802*  -0.889 1.128 
Two-steps -8.774* -0.964 1,121 
GMM-SYS 
   
One-step -6.844* 0.527 3.509 
Two-steps -6.452* 0.882 3.096 
Note: * statistically significant at the 5% level 
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Table 7: Elasticities of investment rate (s0) and steady-state growth rate (Yˆ ) with respect 
to policy treatment (Ms) computed at the sample mean by regional group 
Elasticity GMM-DIFF (1-step) 
GMM-DIFF 
(2-steps) 
GMM-SYS 
(1-step) 
GMM-SYS 
(2-steps) 
i
Ms ,ε  
  
  
All EU15 Obj. 1 regions 0,067 0,044 0,145 0,068 
France - Obj. 1 regions 0,371 0,337 0,339 0,149 
Germany - Obj. 1 regions 0,008 -0,034 0,049 0,075 
Greece - Obj. 1 regions -0,030 -0,028 0,142 0,018 
Italy - Obj. 1 regions 0,039 0,016 0,117 0,062 
Portugal - Obj. 1 regions 0,176 0,149 0,188 0,102 
Spain - Obj. 1 regions -0,001 -0,013 0,139 0,040 
Other EU15 Obj. 1 regions 0,126 0,064 0,085 0,124 
i
MY ,ˆε  
  
  
All EU15 Obj. 1 regions 0,064 0,052 0,508 0,311 
France - Obj. 1 regions 0,351 0,395 1,184 0,678 
Germany - Obj. 1 regions 0,008 -0,040 0,171 0,343 
Greece - Obj. 1 regions -0,029 -0,032 0,495 0,083 
Italy - Obj. 1 regions 0,037 0,019 0,410 0,285 
Portugal - Obj. 1 regions 0,167 0,174 0,658 0,464 
Spain - Obj. 1 regions -0,001 -0,015 0,486 0,183 
Other EU15 Obj. 1 regions 0,119 0,075 0,297 0,567 
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1
 Distinguishing between conditional and club convergence may be indeed difficult (Islam, 
2003). Club convergence is, in fact, a particular case of conditional convergence. The latter 
implies a region-specific steady-state level, whereas club convergence implies multiple 
steady-state equilibria, one for any group (club) of regions. 
2
  Besides β-convergence, the alternative concept of σ-convergence has been proposed (Barro 
and Sala-I-Martin, 1992; Quah, 1996). Whereas the former deals with the expected value of 
income growth conditional on its initial value, the latter concerns its statistical distribution 
across regions, over time or both. β-convergence is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
have σ-convergence.   
3
 According to the European Commission (2001, p. 131), “transfers from the structural funds 
added directly to demand and economic activity, but more importantly, since they were con-
centrated on investment […], they were aimed at increasing growth potential in the medium 
and long-term. […] The estimates of the “supply-side” effects on growth […] become pre-
dominant in the long-term. […] Although structural policies are ultimately judged in terms of 
their effect in narrowing regional disparities in GDP per head of employment, it is their im-
pact on the underlying factors which determine economic development which is prime con-
sideration.”    
4
 A more complete picture on the whole set of issues, as well as approaches, about the EU 
structural policy evaluation can be found in Bachtler and Wren (2006).   
5
 In particular, Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) provide further interesting details in this 
respect. 
6
 We acknowledge the interesting suggestions and critical remarks made by an anonymous 
referee on the detailed representation of Objective 1 SF in the adopted model. They have been 
particularly helpful in improving a previous version of the model.     
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7
 Alternatively, as clarified in the fourth section, the region-specific term may be random. 
8
 Since T is always positive and largely >1, for simplicity we assume that when T=0 then 
lnT=0. 
9
 The assumption is made that si remains constant, if not shocked by M, and its observed ini-
tial level corresponds to the steady-state level. 
10
 This virtual currency converts all national currencies into the common European currency 
(Ecu-Euro) and then adjusts for the different purchasing power within the countries. 
11
 The current NUTS classification actually comprises 211 NUTS II regions, but, owing to 
data availability, Ireland and NUTS I German regions Sachsen and Sachsen-Anhalt are in-
cluded as single NUTS II regions.  
12
 Badinger et al. (2002) assume a much higher value (0,25). In the present case, however, 
different values of this term do not relevantly affect the estimation results.  
13
  For extensive information on data sources and treatment, including the regional attribution 
of multiregional funds, see Bussoletti (2004). 
14
  This variable can be computed only for year 1999; thus, the 1999 value has been main-
tained over the whole 1989-2000 period. This assumption seems acceptable taking into ac-
count that infrastructural indicators usually show very little variations over time.       
15
 As suggested by an anonymous referee, different groupings of Objective 1 regions could be 
proposed to interpret the mentioned differences. Nonetheless, clustering Objective 1 regions 
by country remains the most meaningful solution, as the country-effect still strongly condi-
tions the regional performance. Results computed and reported by regional clusters, however, 
do not imply club convergence. In the conditional convergence approach here adopted, any 
region has its own steady-state, though groups of regions may show similarities in how condi-
tioning variables affect it.       
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16
 Although it is out of the 1994-1999 programming period, year 2000 is included in the sam-
ple period in order to take account of the growth effect of the last year of payments (1999).  
17
 Nevertheless, several empirical studies suggest that, in finite samples, the two-step estima-
tor may actually generate little, if any, efficiency improvement while the one-step estimator 
may also outperform the two-steps counterpart in terms of robustness (Blundell and Bond, 
1998; Carmeci and Mauro, 2003; Gaduh, 2002; Judson and Owen, 1999).  
18
 Bond et al. (2001) obtain a 2,4% convergence rate with a GMM-SYS estimator using the 
same data set and model specifications as adopted by Caselli et al. (1996), who reported a 
13% GMM-DIFF estimate. 
19
 This statistic is distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis of all instruments or-
thogonal to the respective error terms and with degrees of freedom given by the difference 
between the number of moment conditions and of unknown parameters. 
20
 Both statistics are distributed as standard normal under the null hypothesis of no serial cor-
relation. 
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